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Abstract
The classical Roy-model of selection on the labor market is extended in
order to analyze intergenerational mobility. This is done by linking ability
uncertainty to family background. I derive implications for the allocation of
talent and for background dependent earnings patterns within occupations
and show that a very compressed wage structure can cause negative sorting
of people with family background in the occupation with low returns to
ability. I also study the e¤ects of income redistribution on mobility and
talent allocation. It is found that a redistributive welfare system either
reduces vertical mobility or enhances it at the cost of a shrinking proportion
of people choosing the occupation with high returns.
Keywords: Intergenerational mobility, occupational choice, allocation of
talent, redistribution.
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Intergenerational mobility, or the degree to which economic and social status are
transmitted from parents to o¤spring, has received attention both in the theoreti-
cal and the empirical literature.1 While sociologists have focused on occupational
or class mobility, economists have taken a greater interest in income mobility.
There are both equality and e¢ciency implications of intergenerational mo-
bility. Concern for equality of opportunity calls for attention to the extent to
which individual welfare is determined by choices and e¤orts within control of
the individual and to what extent it is predetermined by genes and upbringing.
Furthermore, it is of relevance to what extent the degree of predetermination is
in‡uenced by institutional factors that can be a¤ected by policy. With regard to
e¢ciency, it is of interest whether family background constrains individual choices
in such a way that the allocation of talent is not optimal from society’s point of
view.
Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argue that the allo-
cation of talent has growth implications since talented people in the right jobs
create positive human capital externalities, while they can even be destructive in
the wrong positions. Recent work by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Hassler and
Rodríguez Mora (2000) also emphasizes the reinforcing links between economic
growth and social mobility arguing along the lines that growth provides incen-
tives for mobility which improves the allocation of talent. However, the links to
inequality are a classic subject of debate. Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa
(1999) survey the literature on inequality and growth and conclude that, in the
presence of capital market imperfections, redistribution may foster growth by im-
proving the e¢ciency of human capital (and other) investments and hence the
stimulate the development of new technologies. However, this growth process
is not sustainable since it generates inequalities that lead to ine¢cient resource
allocation.
In summary there seem to be two views: The …rst argues that mobility is stim-
ulated by earnings di¤erences because individuals from weak educational/social
background require stronger economic incentives in order to opt for higher educa-
tion than do individuals with well educated parents. The second, argues that the
reason why individuals from weak educational/social background require stronger
economic incentives is that they are constrained by their lack of resources and
1See e.g. Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), Björklund and Jäntti (1997), Checchi et al (1999),
Eriksson and Jonsson (1996), Mulligan (1997, 1999), Solon (1992), and Zimmerman (1992).
2that redistribution could relieve these constraints and improve allocation.
Mulligan (1997), does not …nd that the empirical evidence on consumption and
earnings mobility complies with the patterns that would be generated if intergen-
erational mobility was in‡uenced resource constraints. Should we then settle for
the idea that inequality enhances mobility? Not necessarily. The contribution
of this paper is to show that family background related ability uncertainty may
hamper social mobility also in the absence of capital market imperfections, and
further, that redistribution may reduce further or enhance mobility depending on
the degree of risk aversion, the incentive structure and, importantly, how redistri-
bution takes place. Another contribution of this paper is to emphasize the role of
heterogeneous human capital by focussing of occupational choice as a mechanism
by which economic status is transmitted from one generation to the next. Occu-
pational mobility can be argued to be of particular relevance for the transmission
of economic status in societies where family income is not the dominant source of
heterogeneity across individuals.
Previous theoretical work by economists on intergenerational mobility, e.g.
Becker and Tomes (1986) has focused mainly on the transmission of income earn-
ing capacity through mechanisms connected to human capital investments and
bequests.2 Such models suggest that because inequality of opportunity is a re-
sult of inequality of outcome in the parent generation working through imperfect
capital markets, policies aimed at providing equal access to education would lead
toward equality of opportunity.
In this model, family background is important because it is assumed that
the occupation of the parents in‡uences the quality of the information a child
has about what it takes to succeed in di¤erent types of careers and about the
child’s talent for di¤erent jobs. In particular, it is assumed that individuals face
more ability uncertainty when considering a career in an unfamiliar occupation
than when judging prospects in the family occupation. I thus introduce family
background determined di¤erences in access to information of a kind which is
similar to what has previously been discussed by sociologists, into the study of
intergenerational mobility.3 However, I do not make the common assumption
that people from a particular background (generally those from well educated
families) always have access to better information. In a wider interpretation,
2Sociologists, on their part, have been more interested in social mobility, i.e. the transmission
of socioeconomic status or class, which is generally measured as some combination of mobility
with regard to occupation, education and income.
3See e.g. Erikson and Jonsson (1996).
3this information advantage need not be restricted to the parental occupation,
but could be relevant also for other occupations that the individual has become
familiar with and gained information about.
By introducing family background e¤ects into a simpli…ed version of Willis’
(1991) formulation of Roy’s classic occupational choice model from 1951, I derive
how the degree of occupational mobility, and how talent allocation and earn-
ings patterns of people with di¤erent family background depend on the incentive
structure of the economy, i.e. on wage di¤erences between occupations and the
sensitivity of earnings to ability within di¤erent occupations.4
I …nd that if return to ability is similar across occupations, ability uncertainty
may cause people with family background in the low returns to ability occupation
to perceive that they can get a higher return on their talent in their family occu-
pation than they would in the high returns to ability occupation. This leads to
negative sorting of people with family background in the low return occupation,
i.e. it causes the high ability people to stay in the low return occupation and the
low ability people to go for the high return occupation. There is, however, always
positive sorting of people with family background in the high return occupation.
Hence, similar returns to ability across occupations may cause newcomers into an
occupation to earn less on average than stayers.
If returns to ability di¤er enough across occupation there is positive sorting of
people regardless of background. If mobility is very low, people with background
in the low-return occupation tend to have higher earnings on average in both
occupations, whereas high mobility implies that people with background in the
high return occupation earn more on average in both occupations.
I also analyze the e¤ects on mobility and talent allocation of three forms of
redistribution. From the results on talent allocation, it can be concluded that
compressing the wage structure in such away that occupations come to be per-
ceived as similar in terms of return to ability may indeed be very costly in terms
of e¢ciency if leads to a situation of negative sorting of newcomers into the high
return occupation.
First, I look at redistributive taxation which redistributes income both within
and across occupations. Second, I turn to redistribution across occupations.
4My treatment of occupation is close to that of Roy (1951) and Sicherman and Galor (1990).
In Roy, occupations di¤er because the require input of di¤erent abilities (or combinations of
abilities). Because people are heterogeneous with respect to their endowment of abilities they
will have comparative advantage for some occupations. Sicherman and Galor de…ne occupations
according to the level and the type human capital required.
4Third, I study the e¤ects of redistribution within an occupation. The …rst form
of redistribution is what economists generally consider when discussing redistri-
bution, i.e. Robin Hood policies, or taking from the rich and giving to the poor
using progressive taxation to …nance welfare programs. The second form of redis-
tribution is indirect and, hence, rarely discussed in terms of redistribution. The
types of policy considered here are subsidies to or protection of certain sectors of
the economy which a¤ect relative wages in the economy. The obvious example
relevant to most developed economies are the huge subsidies to agriculture. Other
examples are the trade restrictions protecting the US automobile industry or the
highly regulated Swedish construction sector. Third, I look at wage compression
within occupations, which is commonly viewed as being an e¤ect of union wage
setting.5
I …nd no simple answer to if redistributive policies enhance or reduce overall
mobility. A redistributive welfare system reduces mobility as well as the propor-
tion of people choosing the high return occupation, if risk aversion is moderate.
However, if risk aversion is strong mobility is enhanced, but it is so at the cost of
less people in the high return occupation unless the occupations are very similar.
Inter-occupational redistribution, or reducing the relative wage in the high
return occupation, increases downward mobility and decreases upward mobility
which results in a smaller share of people in the high return occupation. The total
e¤ect on mobility is either unclear or negative.
If changes in wage dispersion are restricted to one occupation, e.g. as a result of
solidarity wage policy, e¤ects on mobility are complex. However, it is interesting to
note that in the situations when solidarity wage policy in the lowreturn occupation
unambiguously leads to increased upward and total vertical mobility, the driving
force behind the upward mobility is that wage compression in the low return
occupation actually increased the inter-occupational return di¤erence. On the
other hand, when upward mobility increases as a result of wage compression in
the high returns occupation, the driving force tends to be the reduction in risk
connected to choosing that occupation.
Contrary to the results in the human capital models of intergenerational mobil-
ity, this paper illustrates that equality of outcome in the parent generation or free
education do not guarantee equality of opportunity of the young generation. The
information di¤erences introduced in this model make the allocation of talent and
earning capacity depend on family background also in the absence of the human
5In wage negotiations unions demand equal pay for equal job disregarding individual pro-
ductivity di¤erences. See e.g. Freeman and Medo¤ (1984).
5capital investment costs and credit market imperfections or genetic transmission
of ability for that matter, that are the driving forces behind the transmission of
inequality in the Becker-Tomes model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a model in which occupa-
tional choice is in‡uenced by family background. Section 3 analyses the impli-
cations of the model for mobility, allocation of talent and for earnings patterns.
The fourth section uses the tools developed in sections 2 and 3 to address the
question in the title of the paper by analyzing the e¤ects of di¤erent forms of
redistribution. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
This section outlines a simple model of how young individuals, who are het-
erogeneous in abilities and family background, make occupational choices. The
structure of the model is inspired by Willis’ (1986) version of Roy’s occupational
choice model dating from 1951. The Roy-model does not deal directly with inter-
generational mobility. Instead it focuses on how occupational choice is governed
by comparative ability advantages and on the implications of such choices on the
distribution of income and allocation of talent. I introduce uncertainty about abil-
ity into the Roy-model. In order to capture the in‡uence of family background
on occupational choice, I assume that people can assess their ability to work in
their parents’ occupation but that they are uncertain about how able they are to
work in other, unfamiliar, occupations.
2.1. Basic structure
I consider individuals as young and as workers. When young, individuals are sup-
ported by their parents while choosing a future occupation. In working life, indi-
viduals live o¤ their own earnings. Since the implications of resource constraints
have been thoroughly analyzed by Becker and Tomes and others, I abstract from
that kind of inequality of opportunity by assuming that all individuals receive the
same amount of money from their parents and that education is free. This implies
that the individual’s choice of occupation does not in‡uence the level of consump-
tion as young. Hence, the individual simply chooses the occupation which yields
the highest expected working life utility.
Working life utility of an individual who chooses occupation i depends on the
level of consumption, ci, that is achieved while working in occupation i: This level
6of consumption may be subject to uncertainty because the individual cannot be
sure how well he will succeed in the chosen occupation. The individual cares
about expected working life utility:
E [U(ci)] U
0 > 0; U
00 < 0: (2.1)
I assume that the utility function has constant relative risk aversion. The coef-







The individual in‡uences his level of consumption as a worker through the
choice of occupation. Because I disregard savings, consumption as a worker is
determined by earnings:
ci = Yi(Ai); (2.3)
where earnings, Yi; in occupation i depend on the individual’s endowment of the
occupation speci…c ability Ai:
While the Roy-model assumes that each occupation requires a combination
of abilities, I assume that there is one ability speci…c to each occupation. It is
further assumed that there are only two occupations and two abilities, h (high)
and l (low). I also assume that each individual is endowed with ability speci…c
to each occupation and that occupations di¤er precisely because they require
di¤erent abilities. Each individual has ability A such that
A = fAig; i = h;l: (2.4)
In the entire population, abilities are assumed to be joint log normally distributed
with the same mean and variance such that lnAh and lnAl are joint normally
distributed with zero mean, unit variance and correlated with ½: Log normality
implies that ability is always greater than zero and, furthermore, that the ability
distribution is skewed since there is no upper bound to ability. The natural log-
arithm of ability, which is used later in the analysis, is symmetrically distributed
around zero.
It is further assumed that the individual has full information about his endow-
ment of the ability speci…c to his family occupation, but that he faces uncertainty
about his endowment of the ability speci…c to the unfamiliar occupation.6 The
6More realistic would perhaps be to assume uncertainty also with regard to ability for the fam-
ily occupation, but that the uncertainty regarding the unfamiliar occupation would be greater.
However, results would not be signi…cantly altered qualitatively.
7individual thus forms a prior belief about the uncertain ability based on knowl-
edge about ability in the family occupation, knowledge about how abilities are
distributed in the population in general and on how abilities are correlated. I
assume that abilities are not correlated across generations.
First de…ne:
ai ´ lnAi: (2.5)
Let j be the family occupation, then the individual knows his ability for occupation
j. The individual thus forms a prior belief about ai based on aj and ½: The prior
distribution for ai is:
f(ai j aj) = N(aj½;
p
1 ¡ ½2): (2.6)
The standard deviation of the prior distribution is larger the closer to zero the
correlation between the two abilities.




i i = h;l; (2.7)
where earnings, Yi; depend on the wage rate, Wi, on the individual’s endowment of
occupation i speci…c ability Ai; and on the occupation speci…c parameter ¯i which
determines the sensitivity to ability of earnings in occupation i. Henceforth, A
¯i
i is
referred to as the individual’s productivity in occupation i. Note that productivity
and earnings increase with ability sensitivity, ¯i; if ability Ai, is larger than one. If
ability is less than one, increasing ability sensitivity lowers individual productivity.
As an analogue to the Roy model, we can see that if individuals are randomly
assigned to occupations, the distribution of the natural logarithm of earnings in
each occupation i is: lnYi v N(lnWi;¯i): Empirically evidence on earnings distri-
butions rather supports this implication, and can hence justify our distributional
assumption regarding ability. The model implies a positive relation between the
ability intensity of an occupation and the standard deviation of earnings within
the occupation. In the model, the actual distribution of earnings within an occu-
pation, however, deviates from this because the individual’s choice of occupation
depends on ability and family background.
2.2. The choice of occupation
I assume that the individual chooses to stay in the family occupation if expected
working life value achieved in the family occupation, j, is at least as high as the
8expected working life value achieved in the unfamiliar occupation, i.
Vj ¸ Vi: (2.8)
Using the utility function, the earnings function and the conditional distri-
bution of ability for the unfamiliar occupation, we derive the value, V , to the
individual in terms of the known ability of choosing the family occupation or the



























is an uncertainty factor capturing the uncertainty involved in choosing the unfa-




is a larger than unity chance factor, resulting from the positive e¤ect on expected
earnings of the possibility that ability for the unfamiliar occupation is high. The
magnitude of the counter veiling risk factor, e¡°
¯2
i
2 (1¡½2), which is associated with
the disutility of facing uncertainty regarding future earnings, depends on the de-
gree of relative risk aversion. When the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, °,
exceeds unity (i.e. log-utility), risk aversion is strong and the risk factor domi-
nates the chance factor such that the uncertainty factor, »; is smaller than unity.
When risk aversion is moderate, ° < 1, the chance factor dominates and the
uncertainty factor, »; is larger than unity.
Combine (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) to derive the following condition for when the

















where we have used the fact that aj =lnAj: Henceforth a is referred to as ability.
7See appendix A1.
9Condition (2.12) tells us that the individual’s choice of occupation depends
on the di¤erence in productivity at expected ability (the left hand side), the
di¤erence in wage rates and the last term on the right hand side which is the
natural logarithm of the uncertainty factor »j. Henceforth, the natural logarithm
of the uncertainty factor »j is called the risk premium on choosing the unfamiliar
occupation. If risk aversion is strong (s.r.a.), ° > 1; the risk premium is negative,
implying that the individual demands a higher wage to compensate for the risk
in order to choose the unfamiliar occupation if the return to expected ability
is the same in both occupations. If risk aversion is moderate (m.r.a.), ° < 1;
the risk premium is positive.8 The magnitude of the risk premium is greater
the greater is ¯i; i.e. the higher are the potential gains/losses of opting for the
uncertain occupation. The more closely correlated the two abilities, the smaller
the absolute size of the premium, since closer correlation implies that there is less
uncertainty.
Condition (2.12) implies that if the family occupation is perceived to be more





above a certain ability level chooses the family occupation. If the unfamiliar
occupation is perceived to be more ability sensitive, individuals below a certain
ability level stay in the family occupation. In general, the occupation which is
perceived as more ability sensitive attracts the most able people. I de…ne a cut-o¤
ability, a¤
J; for people with parents in the j-occupation, for which expected value




















When analyzing the determinants and consequences of the individual’s choice
to stay in or leave the family occupation, three states can be distinguished based
on the sign of the denominator in 2.13, i.e. depending on which occupation is
perceived to be most sensitive to ability.
State 1: The family occupation is perceived to be the more sensitive to the
known ability, ¯j¡½¯i > 0. This implies that earnings at the expected ability are
8This result regarding the sign of the risk premium is analogous to the discussion in Caballero
(1991) regarding the sign of the investment - uncertainty relationship.
9Remember that the individual chooses the family occupation if expected utility is the same
in both occupations.
10higher in the family occupation, provided that ability is above average (aj > 0).
The individual sticks to the family occupation if aj is at least as high as the cut
o¤ ability:
Family occupation, j; is chosen if aj ¸ a
¤
J: (2.14)
The cut-o¤ ability is positive or negative i.e. above or below average ability,





















where F is the marginal c.d.f. of aj:
State 2: The perceived sensitivity of earnings to aj is higher in the unfamiliar
occupation, ¯j ¡ ½¯i < 0. This condition can only be satis…ed for positive corre-
lation between abilities. Hence, the individual stays in the family occupation if
his aj is smaller than or equal to the cut-o¤ ability:
Family occupation, j, is chosen if aj · a
¤
J:
Again the level of the cut-o¤ ability depends on wage rates and the risk premium.
a
¤













Mobility, MJ; in state 2 is:
MJ = 1 ¡ F(a
¤
J):
State 3: In State 3, both occupations are perceived as equally sensitive to abil-
ity, ¯j ¡ ½¯i = 0. Hence, ability does not matter for occupational choice. Occu-
pational choice depends only on the relative wage and on the risk premium. The




























112.3. E¢ciency and Steady State
In order to discuss the implications of the individual’s decision rules it is useful
to de…ne what is meant by e¢cient talent allocation and level of mobility as
well as de…ne what would be a steady state in the model. The occupations are
henceforth referred to as h (high) and l (low), where it is assumed that ¯h > ¯l:
This assumption implies that H-people, i.e. those whose parents are in the h-
occupation always perceive the h-occupation as more ability sensitive. L-people,
on the other hand, may be in state 1, 2 or 3.10 Hence, there are two situations that
need be analyzed: Hierarchia, in which people regardless of background perceive
the h-occupation as more ability sensitive, and Egalitaria, in which people of both
backgrounds perceive their own family occupation as the most ability sensitive.
E¢ciency
Assuming that society is risk neutral, an e¢cient allocation of talent is one
which maximizes total expected earnings, rather than total expected value. This
implies that the expected earnings of the marginal individual should be equal in
both occupations. It is straight forward to derive the cut-o¤ ability associated
with this de…nition of e¢ciency. For those with parents in the j¡occupation (i.e.
the unfamiliar occupation is i):
a
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The e¢cient cut-o¤ levels imply a larger fraction of people opting for the unknown
occupation than what is the case when the individual’s choice is in‡uenced by
risk aversion. The reason is that, with risk neutrality, the potential loss of having
someone of poor talent in the wrong occupation is smaller the potential gain to
society from having the very talented in the right place.
Steady State
Steady state is de…ned as a situation in which the fractions of the total popu-
lation that choose each occupation is constant in each generation. Let upper-case
letters represent the occupation of the parents and lower-case represent the oc-
cupation chosen by the young generation, such that PH is the fraction of the
total population with parents in the h¡occupation, i.e. the fraction of H-people.
Hence, (1 ¡ PH) is the fraction of L-people. MH is the share of H-people that
10State 3 will not be analyzed here.
12are mobile , i.e. who choose the l-occupation, and (1 ¡ MH) is the fraction of
H-people who choose to stay in the h-occupation. ML is the mobile fraction of
L-people, i.e. who opt for the h-occupation and the rest, (1 ¡ ML); stay in the
l-occupation. Ph is the proportion of the present generation that chooses occupa-
tion h. Steady-state is de…ned by two equations:
Ph = PH(1 ¡ MH) + (1 ¡ PH)ML
Ph = PH:






and total steady state mobility is:




3. Talent Allocation, Mobility and Earnings Patterns
3.1. Allocation of talent and mobility
Based on the decision rules established in the previous section, this section char-
acterizes the allocation of talent, mobility and earnings patterns in Egalitaria and
Hierarchia. The discussion focuses on situations with positive ability correlation
and it is assumed that ¯h > ¯l; and Wh ¸ Wl:
Since ¯h > ¯l; H-people with below cut-o¤ ability are mobile and choose the




where F is the marginal c.d.f. of ah: Depending on which state the L-people are
in there is either positive or negative sorting of L-people. L-mobility is:
ML =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 ¡ F(a¤
L) if ¯l ¡ ½¯h < 0 Hierarchia: positive sorting
1 if ¯l ¡ ½¯h = 0 and ln
Wh




0 if ¯l ¡ ½¯h = 0 and ln
Wh





L) if ¯l ¡ ½¯h > 0 Egalitaria: negative sorting
13In Egalitaria, where there is not unanimous ranking of the two occupations
and occupations are in a sense similar, mobility is referred to as horizontal mobil-
ity. In Hierarchia, there is unanimous ranking of occupations in terms of ability
sensitivity and mobility is called vertical mobility.
Hierarchia: vertical mobility
In Hierarchiathe mostable, regardless of background, choose the h-occupation,
i.e. there is positive sorting. When risk aversion is strong (s.r.a.), a¤
H is always
negative, implying that less than half of the H-people are mobile. Unless Wh is
su¢ciently much larger than Wl; a¤
L is positive, which implies that less than 50 per
cent mobility also of L-people when wage rates are similar. When risk aversion is
moderate, a¤
L is always negative while a¤
H is positive unless Wh is su¢ciently much
larger than Wl: This implies that a majority of L-people are mobile and that this
is so also for H-people if wage rates are similar. For given wage rates, mobility
is higher the weaker is risk aversion. It can be shown that a¤
L is always more
extreme, i.e. further from the mean ability zero, unless risk aversion is strong and
Wh is su¢ciently much larger than Wl:11 The reason for this is that the risk factor
is of greater magnitude for L-people than for H-people.
To see what earnings patterns prevail, compare expected log earnings of stayers
and newcomers in the two occupations. Newcomers on average earn more in the



































Given what is known about the cut-o¤ abilities, the …rst condition will tend to
hold when there is strong risk aversion and be violated when there is moderate
risk aversion. The second condition will hold if risk aversion is strong enough,
i.e. if mobility is very low. In the e¢cient allocation, cut-o¤ abilities are such
that mobility is even higher than in the moderate risk aversion case. Hence, the
di¤erence in average earnings is even larger in favor of the h-people.12









14When risk aversion is strong, the few L-people who venture upward into oc-
cupation h have high l-ability. Provided that there is positive ability correlation,
they potentially earn more on average than the H-people who stayed in their fam-
ily occupation. The rare few H-people who choose occupation l are low ability
people and by the same argument, they therefore earn less than the L-people who
choose to stay in occupation l. Hence, when there is strong risk aversion and
vertical mobility, L-people will on average earn more in both occupations.
When risk aversion is moderate, a majority of the L-people venture into occu-
pation h and only the most brilliant of the H-people stay in their family occupa-
tion. As a result, the H-people who choose to stay in their family occupation on
average earn more than the newcomers. Only the least able of the L-people choose
occupation l . The large group of H-people who opt for occupation l; on average,
earns more than the L- people who stay in their family occupation. Hence, when
there is moderate risk aversion and vertical mobility, H-people on average earn
more in both occupations.
Egalitaria: horizontal mobility
In Egalitaria there is positive sorting of H-people and negative sorting of L-
people. When risk aversion is strong a¤
H is always negative and so is a¤
L; unless Wh
is su¢ciently much larger than Wl. Hence, mobility is low. When risk aversion is
moderate both cut-o¤ abilities are positive, again unless Wh is su¢ciently much
larger than Wl in which case a¤
H is negative. Like in Hierarchia, it can be shown
that a¤
L is more extreme than a¤
H unless wage rates are very di¤erent.
In Egalitaria those who opt for the unfamiliar occupation are those who have
low ability for their family occupation. When there is positive ability correlation,
this implies that newcomers intoan occupation will tend to have lowability also for
the new occupation and will hence, on average, tend to earn less than those with



































It is not evident that these conditions hold. However, in simulations both condi-
tions tend to hold unless ability correlation is too weak.
154. Mobility, Earnings Patterns and Changes in the Incen-
tive Structure
This section analyses how mobility and earnings patterns of people from di¤erent
background are a¤ected by policies that change the incentive structure. E¤ects
on steady state mobility and steady state allocation of people between the two
occupations are also analyzed. First, I introduce a more or less progressive redis-
tributive welfare system. Second, I investigate e¤ects of changes in relative wages
that is a result of inter-occupational redistribution, and third, I analyze increased
or reduced wage compression resulting from more or less solidarity wage policy13.
4.1. De…ning the policies considered
Redistributive welfare system: Increasing the progressiveness of a redistributive
welfare policy is de…ned as a simultaneous proportional reduction of sensitivity of
earnings to ability in both occupations in combination with a reduction in wage
rates leading toward equalization of wage rates. I assume that the disposable
earnings function in occupation takes the following form
Y
d = Y
1¡t; 0 · t < 1; (4.1)
and the average tax rate ¿
¿ = 1 ¡
Y d
Y
= 1 ¡ Y
¡t; (4.2)
is increasing in earnings. The larger is t, the more progressive the tax system. A
tax-system of this kind would always run a surplus.
Inter-occupational redistribution: Increasing (reducing) the relative wage in
the high-occupation
Wh
Wl = W, represents a redistribution from occupation l to
h(or vice versa).
Solidarity wage policy: A reduction in the sensitivity of earnings to ability, ¯;
in an occupation will be regarded as an e¤ect of increased solidarity wage policy
since it implies a change in the direction of ”equal job equal pay”, regardless of
productivity.
13See e.g. Edin and Holmlund (1993) for a critical discussion of solidarity wage policy as the
cause behind Swedish wage compression.
16Introducing taxation I can derive cut o¤ ability for an individual with family




















Figure 4.1 illustrates the …rst and last experiments to be analyzed when the
economy starts out as an hierarchical economy. The second policy experiment, re-
distribution across occupations does not a¤ect the slopes of the earnings functions,
only the intercept, which is given by the wage rate.













 =Earnings in occupation  i, Yi
s = Earnings in occupation  i under solidarity wage
policy, Yi
t = Earnings in occupation  i with redistributive welfare system,
 h=high return occupation,  l=low return occupation.
Comparative statics on cut-o¤ abilities a¤
H and a¤
L, mobility, MH, ML and M;
and the share of H-people, PH with respect to the incentive structure parameters,
t;W;¯l;¯h; reveal how choices and talent allocation are a¤ected by policy changes.
It is assumed that only one policy instrument is activated at a time.
Clearly, when the mobility of people of both background is a¤ected in the same
direction, the e¤ect on total mobility is clear. Similarly, if mobility of H¡ and
L¡ people are a¤ected in di¤erent directions, the steady state e¤ect on the total
17share of H-people is unambiguously such that if MH increases while ML decreases
total share of H-people decreases.
The results of the comparative statics on MH, ML are summarized in tables 1
and 2a,b. Algebraic results are presented in appendices A.4-A.7.
Table 1
E¤ects on mobility of redistribution
redistributive welfare system











4.2. Redistributive welfare system
Raising t has the same e¤ect on mobility whether the returns to ability are similar
or not. There will be a reduction of mobility of both L- and H-people who
are moderately risk averse while strongly risk averse people will become more
mobile, regardless of background. Hence, a more redistributive welfare system
increases e¢ciency if people are strongly risk averse, but reduces e¢ciency if
people are moderately risk averse. In Hierarchia, regardless of attitude toward
risk, background related earnings di¤erences in both occupations will be reduced.
In Egalitaria, average earnings increase for all groups if risk aversion is strong
and decrease for all groups if risk aversion is moderate. Hence, e¤ects on average
earnings di¤erences between people from di¤erent background are not clear.
It can be shown that in Hierarchia increased taxation leads to reduced mobility
and a smaller share of people in the h-occupation when there is moderate risk
aversion.14 With strong risk aversion increased mobility will come at the price of
reduced share of people in the h-occupation unless wage rates are very similar. In
Egalitaria, the e¤ects on mobility are the same, the e¤ect on the share of H-people
is unclear unless wage rates are very similar and risk aversion is strong. Then,
increased taxation will increased mobility and a higher share of H-people.
14See appendix A.8.
184.3. Interoccupational redistribution
A change in relative wages as a result of interoccupational redistribution will,
of course, induce more people, regardless of family background, to choose the
occupation in which the relative wage is increased. A relative wage decrease
in the h-occupation would hence reduce PH: The e¤ect on total mobility are
either unclear or negative.15 In Egalitaria, an implication of this is that the
productivity di¤erence between people from di¤erent backgrounds will increase
to the favor of H-people in the h-occupation and be reduced in the l-occupation.
In Hierarchia, the average productivity increases for both L- and H-people in the
two occupations.
4.4. Introducing solidarity wage policy
In general, disregarding uncertainty, a reduction in ¯ makes an occupation more
attractive to an individual with below average (negative) ability and less attrac-
tive to an individual with above average ability. Uncertainty about ability will,
however, a¤ect the individual’s reaction to changes in the sensitivity of earnings
ability in the unfamiliar occupation. The ability level at which the individual
…nds that a reduction in ability sensitivity makes the unfamiliar occupation more
or less attractive thus deviates from zero. If risk aversion is strong, a reduction
in ability sensitivity of the unfamiliar occupation makes that occupation more
attractive also for moderately positive abilities because the reduction in return to
expected ability is compensated for by the reduction in risk. If risk aversion is
moderate, however, a reduction in ability sensitivity of the unfamiliar occupation
makes that occupation less attractive for individuals with moderately negative
ability because the reduction in risk does not compensate for the substantial loss
in terms of expected earnings. In other words, the e¤ect of solidarity wage policies
on the mobility of people with di¤erent background will thus depend on the initial
position of the cut o¤ abilities and on which occupation is a¤ected by the policy.
From tables 2a and 2b it can be seen that the mobility pattern of H-people
depends on the relation between ¯h and ¯l: The e¤ects on H-mobility are qualita-
tively the same if the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l changes as a result of less/more
solidarity wage policy in the h-occupation or more/less ditto in the l-occupation.
If there is strong risk aversion, the mobility of H-people increases with the di¤er-
ence in return to ability. If there is moderate risk aversion, H-mobility increases
15See appendix A.9.
19with the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l when wage rates di¤er enough. If wage
rates are similar H-mobility decreases with the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l.
The mobility pattern of the L-people is slightly more complex. However, if
risk aversion is moderate, it is only the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l that matters.
In Egalitaria, the mobility of L-people increases with the di¤erence between ¯h
and ¯l and reaches its peak of complete mobility at the border between Egalitaria
and Hierarchia. If the di¤erence increases further, L-mobility declines. However,
if the wage di¤erence is small enough in Hierarchia, upward mobility will increase
again if the di¤erence in ability return gets large enough.
When risk aversion is strong , L-mobility increases with the di¤erence in return
to ability if the wage di¤erence is large enough. Mobility peaks at complete
mobility when ½¯h = ¯l; and then declines as the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l
gets larger. When the wage di¤erence is small, mobility declines to zero mobility
at ½¯h = ¯l and then, in Hierarchia, upward mobility increases as the di¤erence
in returns to ability increases. If the di¤erence between ¯h and ¯l rises beyond
½¯h
2 = ¯l as a result of increased ¯h, L-mobility declines for all relative wages.
To summarize, in Hierarchia, upward mobility tends to be stimulated by wage
compression in the h-occupation and hampered by wage compression in the l-
occupation. The exceptions to this rule occur when wage rates are similar. In
Hierarchia, upward mobility and total mobility can be stimulated by solidarity
wage policy in the l-occupation because it makes returns to ability more di¤er-
ent. This is the case when risk aversion is strong and wage rates are similar.
Upward and total mobility can also be stimulated by wage compression in the
h-occupation. This is the case when risk aversion is moderate and wage rates
are similar and the reason is then that the h-occupation becomes less risky to
the L-people and less interesting to the H-people. Wage compression in the h-
occupation can also reduce upward and total mobility. This is the case when risk
aversion is strong and wage rates are similar.
20Table 2a
E¤ects on mobility, M, of solidarity wage policy
Egalitaria, ¯h > ½¯l; ¯l > ½¯h:
The sign of @Mi conditional on the relative wage rate lnW















































; ln»h < ch:
Mi = Mobility of i-people, i = H;L:
s.r.a=strong risk aversion, m.r.a= moderate risk aversion.
21Table 2b
E¤ects on mobility, M, of solidarity wage policy
Hierarchia ¯h > ½¯l; ¯l < ½¯h:
The sign of @Mi conditional on the relative wage rate lnW
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5. Conclusions and Discussion
I have analyzed the role of family background for occupational choice and the
implications for intergenerational mobility of changes in the incentive structure.
The results show that policy makers interested in equality of opportunity, need to
carefully consider the incentive e¤ects of redistributive policies. I show that even
if occupational choices are free in the sense that human capital investments are
free, uncertainty about ability to succeed in an unfamiliar occupation is enough
to make family background in‡uence talent allocation and earnings. Therefore,
22equality of outcome in the parent generation or free education do not guarantee
that there will be equality of opportunity in the young generation. This also
suggests that if earnings do not re‡ect individual productivity, i.e. because of
progressive taxation, labor market regulations or union wage setting, measures of
intergenerational earnings mobility may not capture signi…cant intergenerational
persistence in underlying productivity generated by intergenerational persistence
in occupational choice.
The ability uncertainty introduced in this paper in‡uences how people self-
select into di¤erent occupations and will generate background dependent di¤er-
ences in mean earnings due to this self-selection. Hence, the model generates a
set of testable predictions for how background related earnings di¤erences should
look in di¤erent occupations. If there is very little vertical mobility we should
expect to …nd that people from a low return background earn more on average in
both occupations than people from high return background. If there is high ver-
tical mobility, the high return background people should on average earn more.
If the earnings structure is compressed enough, negative sorting of low return
background people causes newcomers to earn less in both the high and low return
occupations.
I can conclude that there is no simple answer to the question posed in the title
of this paper: Does wage equality nail the cobbler to his last? Thus, our analysis
provides no whole hearted support for increased wage dispersion as a means to
increase the e¢ciency of the talent allocation through improved mobility even
in the absence of capital market imperfections. Whether there is a trade o¤ or
not between redistributive policies and intergenerational mobility depends on a
number of factors. However, in the case of a redistributive welfare system, the
joint e¤ect of reducing the di¤erence in return to ability and the di¤erence in wage
rates either total reduces vertical mobility and the relative size of the h-occupation
or increases vertical mobility at the cost of a smaller h-occupation.
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A. Appendix
A.1. The expected value in the unfamiliar occupation
The expected value in the unfamiliar occupation, i, is
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dai: Complete the square in





































ing the …rst exponent out of the integral gives:
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dai is the integral of a normal
distribution with mean [(1¡½2)(1¡°)¯i+½aj] and variance (1¡½2) which is equal
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The thick curve in …gure A1 is
f(a)





With strong risk aversion, a¤
H is negative and always smaller than a¤
L; which is
positive unless wage rates are very di¤erent. Hence the condition 3.2 will tend to
hold since the LHS is negative unless ½ is very small. Condition 3.1 will also tend
to hold unless the RHS is too large. With moderate risk aversion, a¤
L is negative
and always more extreme than a¤
H. Then both conditions are likely to be violated.
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moderate risk aversion, ° < 1 :
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strong risk aversion, ° > 1 :
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moderate risk aversion, ° < 1 :
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moderate risk aversion ° < 1:
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H) = 1; but since moderate
risk aversion in Hierarchia implies that a¤



















Strong risk aversion, ° > 1 :
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Strong risk aversion in Hierarchia implies that a¤
L > a¤
H; which is negative,
but that a¤
L is more extreme than a¤
H only provided
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H) < 1 unless
Wh
Wl is large enough. This implies that if
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unity, the sign of
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@t is unclear, but if
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Wl is large enough,
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is ¯h compared to ¯l; the more likely is it that
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It is easily seen that if a¤
L = a¤
H the right-most term equals unity. When risk
aversion is moderate, a¤
L and a¤
H are both positive a¤
L > a¤














@t undetermined. Again the larger the di¤erence between the occupations in


















With strong risk aversion a¤













































































(¯h¡½¯l) < 1; but positive or equal to zero.






H) = 1; but since moderate
risk aversion in Hierarchia implies that a¤
L < 0 and more extreme than a¤
H; which
is positive unless ln
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(¯h¡½¯l) as ¯l¡½¯h gets closer to zero,
i.e. the more similar the two occupations. With strong risk aversion a¤
H < 0 and
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(¯h¡½¯l) < 1; but positive or equal to zero.






H) = 1; but since moderate risk
aversion in Egalitaria implies that a¤















H) < 1: Hence @M







tend to be larger than
(¯l¡½¯h)
(¯h¡½¯l) the more similar the two occupations, in which
case mobility declines as
Wh
Wl becomes smaller. With strong risk aversion a¤
H < 0
32and more extreme if
Wh
Wl is large enough. Mobility will decline as long as a¤
L is
more extreme than a¤
H;i.e: if
Wh
Wl is small enough. If
Wh
Wl is large enough, the e¤ect
is unclear, but again if ¯l ¡ ½¯h is close enough to zero mobility declines.
Figure A5
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